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Abstract
We examine variation in hospital quality across ownership, market concentration and membership of a
hospital system. We use a measure of quality derived from the penalties imposed on hospitals under the
flagship Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program. We employ a novel estimation approach that extracts
latent hospital quality from panel data on penalties and addresses the problem of never- or always-penalized
hospitals in short panels. Our quality measure correlates strongly across penalized conditions and with other
non-incentivized quality metrics. We document a robust and sizable for-profit quality gap, which is largely
crowded out by competition, particularly amongst high-quality and system-organized hospitals.
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partment of Economics, Zürichbergstrasse 14, CH-8039 Zürich, Switzerland, rainer.winkelmann@econ.uzh.ch.
Acknowledgments: We thank participants of the Econometrics Workshop (Melbourne), International Panel Data
Conference (Thessaloniki), Australian Health Economics Society conference (Sydney), iHEA (Basel), Econo-
metrics Workshop (VU Wellington), Australasian Workshop on Econometrics and Health Economics (Darwin)
as well as seminar participants at CINCH (Essen), Monash University and the University of Zurich, for helpful
comments. We also thank Daniel Avdic, Joseph Doyle, Denzil Fiebig, Martin Gaynor, Joe Hirschberg, Andrew
Jones, Maarten Lindeboom, Jenny Lye, Janina Nemitz, Edward Norton, Peter Sivey, Chris Skeels, Jonathan
Skinner, Eric Sun, and Jenny Williams for helpful comments.
Funding: Staub acknowledges funding from the Australian Research Council through grant DE170100644.
Winkelmann acknowledges financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
1
1 Introduction
Historically, the hospital industry has been characterized by a large role for non-profit organizations. However,
over time, the share of patients treated in for-profit hospitals and hospitals that are part of systems1 has
increased considerably in the USA. From 1993 to 2017, the share of for-profits rose from 18 to over 26 percent
and system hospitals experienced a similar increase. Thus, as the industry evolves, the long-standing question
of whether for-profits and not-for-profits behave di↵erently has important implications for anti-trust regulation
(Capps, Carlton and David, 2017) and attempts to increase quality in the hospital market (Doyle, Graves and
Gruber, 2019). In a seminal paper, Sloan et al. (2001) found that whilst for-profits and not-for-profits may have
di↵erent objectives (Besley and Malcomson, 2018), when for-profits and not-for-profits operated in competitive
environments, they behaved similarly. Much of the literature which has empirically examined the relationship
between market structure and hospital quality has drawn on this, arguing that when modeling the relationship
between hospital behavior and market structure, it can be assumed that non-profits behave as for-profits (recent
examples include Chandra et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016). Yet, so far the literature has found mixed results
(Baltagi and Yen, 2014; Colla et al., 2016; Cooper, Gibbons and Skellern, 2018; Dranove and Satterthwaite,
2000; McClellan and Staiger, 2000; Paul, Quosigk and MacDonald, 2019; Picone, Chou and Sloan, 2002).2 By
utilizing a heavily publicized quality metric we are able to document whether such complementarities between
ownership and competitive pressure exists.
In this paper we use a measure of quality derived from one of the A↵ordable Care Act’s (ACA) signature
programs, using a novel and robust estimation approach, to provide evidence on the relationship between
for-profit status, membership of a hospital system, competition and hospital quality in the US. Our measure
of quality is derived from the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), which imposes financial
penalties on hospitals that have annual (risk-adjusted) readmission rates above a threshold.3 While readmission
rates are used by many regulatory authorities as a measure of (poor) hospital quality they are contaminated
by several potential sources of error. First, they are likely to be subject to idiosyncratic variation unrelated to
quality. Second, they are likely to be influenced by demographic factors beyond the standard risk adjustment;
and third, the readmission rate has been documented to contain some regression to the mean (Joshi et al.,
2019). In addition, under HRRP, the number of conditions that were subject to the policy expanded and the
size of the financial penalties was changed repeatedly. This creates empirical challenges in distilling a clean
measure of the underlying stable latent quality from such a dynamic policy environment.
To overcome these problems we extract a measure of the medium-run hospital (and medical condition) latent
quality from hospitals’ HRRP-penalty status (whether or not a hospital was fined). We focus on the propensity
to be penalized as this is observed, results in substantial fines, and remained unchanged over the five years,
1System is defined as either a multi-hospital or a diversified single hospital system. A multi-hospital system
is two or more hospitals owned, leased, sponsored, or contract managed by a central organization (AHA, 2019).
2Eggleston et al. (2008) provide a systematic review of 31 observational studies from 1990 to 2006 and
examine what factors explain the diversity of findings regarding hospital ownership and quality of care. They
find that studies representative of the US as a whole tend to find lower quality among for-profits than private
non-profits, and most adverse e↵ects are located in for-profits, yet their size and significance of the di↵erential
e↵ects depend on the populations and samples considered.
3The majority of evidence points towards a positive e↵ect of this policy (see, inter alia, Dharmarajan et al.
2017, Gupta 2017, and Gupta et al. 2018).
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unlike the penalty amount. We expect that hospital (and potentially demanders of care) will react to the penalty
status (Gupta, 2017; Zhang et al., 2016). Simply focusing on whether a hospital is fined-or-not encounters the
problem that 45% of hospitals were never or always penalized within the five-year period. Standard approaches,
such as binary response panel models, would drop observations of these hospitals from the estimation and
consequently disregard any environmental information for such hospitals. Thus, estimating the binary response
as the outcome makes the implicit assumption that no shock could ever push the hospital over the penalty
cuto↵. To deal with this, we derive a straightforward metric of quality (the latent propensity to hit the
penalty threshold), using a bias-reduced fixed e↵ects generalized linear model (Kunz, Staub and Winkelmann,
2018, referred to as BRglm hereafter), which allows decomposition of the time-variant from the time-invariant
heterogeneity of hospital quality, net of aggregate shocks over time and space (Baltagi and Yen, 2014), and
changes in the policy, such as the numerous changes in the penalty amount over time (Zhang et al., 2016). Our
measure also embeds a shrinkage property considered beneficial in the estimation of fixed e↵ects, implemented
jointly with the estimation of the latent propensity to be penalized. Using our approach, we obtain finite
estimates of the quality of every hospital (one for each condition subject to penalties), including the quality of
those hospitals that were never or always penalized.
Many attempts to incentivize the provision of public services share with the HRRP a similar structure in that
they are yearly, involve nonlinear policy cut-o↵s (e.g. penalty/no-penalty), change rapidly and are used as
the basis for pay-for-performance. They may have large e↵ects on behavior.4 It is thus important to examine
whether the metrics that are published by such policies convey information about quality. While our findings
are specific to the HRRP, they might provide valuable lessons for related settings.
We find quality measures extracted from readmission-penalties in emergency conditions are strongly correlated
across the penalized-conditions, suggesting that they indicate an underlying latent quality at the hospital
level. Our (emergency condition) measures of hospital quality are also strongly associated with a set of non-
incentivized measures of quality —the overall readmission rate in all emergency conditions, mortality in the
target conditions, and patient satisfaction— all these being metrics that capture more direct dimensions of
quality than the propensity to be fined. We find a long positive tail in quality across all three penalized
conditions, implying that some hospitals perform much better than what would be expected given the local
environment they operate in.5 There is, further, substantial spatial heterogeneity across hospital markets as
defined by hospital referral regions [HRR]:6 in some markets, the marginal hospital faces a penalty risk as low
as 15 and in others as high as 95 percent (SD 0.11).
We use these measures to provide new evidence on the association of latent quality with ownership (Sloan et al.,
2001), competition (Gaynor and Town, 2011; Propper, Burgess and Gossage, 2008; Sivey and Chen, 2020),
and system membership (related to managerial oversight, Bloom et al., 2015).7 At the individual hospital
4For example, the publishing of quality metrics may translate into larger market shares for high-quality
hospitals (Chandra et al., 2016) and crowding out lower-quality hospitals, perhaps di↵erentially by ownership
(see, Jones, Propper and Smith, 2017, for example).
5Assessing this would be impossible with more standard measures of quality, such as raw averages of penalty
rates that are often used (as discussed and referenced in Mehta, 2019).
6These are akin to empirically defined markets for health care and may cross state or county borders.
7System is defined by AHA as either a multi-hospital or a diversified single hospital system. A multi-hospital
system is two or more hospitals owned, leased, sponsored, or contract managed by a central organization (AHA,
2019).
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level, we find a sizable quality gap between for-profit and other types of hospitals, echoing extant research (see,
among many others, Aswani et al., 2018; Herrin et al., 2015; Jindal et al., 2018; Paul, Quosigk and MacDonald,
2019). This for-profit quality gap is consistent with a hypothesis that hospitals face di↵erent trade-o↵s between
service provision and increases in penalty risk. While the quality gap between for-profit and other hospitals is
present in regions that are characterized by high- and low-density of hospitals, it decreases strongly with local
measures of competition. Furthermore, this tendency is much stronger in the high-quality tail. This finding is
consistent with the idea that competition drives out di↵erential behavior of for-profit and other firms. In a recent
study based on a similar program for nursing homes, Hackmann (2019) finds that financial reimbursements are
more important than competition in improving patient outcomes. Our study highlights that there might be
important complementarities of such policies. We find that both the for-profit quality gap and the crowding-
out by competition is driven exclusively by hospitals organized into a hospital system (roughly 75 percent of
hospitals AHA, 2019). Such hospitals are likely to have a much greater managerial oversight: for example, many
are Fortune 500 companies. The system or chain dimension of hospital provision has been largely overlooked
to date. An exception is Eliason et al. (2019), who assess the role of chains in the market for dialysis. They
also find a for-profit gap, but one that does not vary with market concentration. In contrast to performance for
dialysis patients, the penalty rates we examine were heavily publicized and are among the main quality signals
available to consumers of health care. It is thus more likely that hospitals compete for patients on the HRRP
signals and need to exert more e↵ort when faced with several hospitals serving the same market.
2 Policy, estimation strategy and data
2.1 Policy
Hospital readmissions have been identified as a major driver of health care costs (Jencks, Williams and Coleman,
2009).8 While costly at the aggregate level, discharging patients too early or not o↵ering su cient post-discharge
care can be rational from the point of view of an individual hospital when reimbursements are based on diagnosis-
related groups rather than actual costs. In an attempt to have hospitals internalize the costs of readmissions,
the 2010 ACA established a financial penalty for hospitals whose Medicare readmission rates exceed a certain
threshold in three common emergency conditions. Since the HRRP’s introduction in October 2012, thousands of
hospitals were fined and billions of dollars in fines were paid. This policy is an example of a broader move towards
improving the quality of health care services by adopting value-based purchasing programs. The program has
received considerable attention in economic (Gupta, 2017; Mellor, Daly and Smith, 2017; Zhang et al., 2016)
and health services research (Bernheim et al., 2016; Desai et al., 2016; Joynt and Jha, 2013). Here we briefly
describe the relevant features of the policy environment; more detail on the timeline and the conversion of the
penalty to the reductions in payments can be found in Appendix A.
Beginning in 2009, hospital readmission rates have been published publicly on an annual basis by the Center
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Announced on March 23, 2010, starting on October 1, 2012 (for the
financial year 2013), eligible hospitals were penalized by up to one percent of their Medicare reimbursements
8It has been estimated that up to $1 billion could be saved yearly by preventing these readmissions (McIl-
vennan, Eapen and Allen, 2015).
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if over the prior three-year period (i.e., from June 2008 to July 2011) there were higher-than-expected risk-
standardized 30-day readmission rates for at least one of the three emergency conditions: acute myocardial
infarction (AMI), heart failure (HF), or pneumonia (PN).
If a Medicare patient was initially hospitalized—based on their primary discharge diagnosis—for one of the
conditions and was readmitted to the same or another hospital within 30 days after release for the same or any
other condition (all-cause), the patient counted as a readmission for the initial hospital. Readmissions were
then used to estimate the probability to be readmitted at a given hospital and compared to the average hospital
with a similar case-mix. Thus, risk-adjustment was based on the case-mix, including age, sex, and co-existing
conditions, but did not account for di↵erences in socio-economic characteristics in the hospitals’ environment.
This changed after 2016, which is why we limit our sample period to before 2017. The resulting risk-adjusted
excess readmission ratio ERRcit in emergency category c at year t measures the “total predicted readmissions at
a hospital [i] compared with the total expected readmission if the patients were treated at an average hospital
with similar patients” (McIlvennan, Eapen and Allen, 2015).
We focus on the extensive margin of a penalty—i.e., if ERRcit > 1—across any, and separately for each, of
the three conditions. This penalty-cuto↵ is the policy-relevant discontinuity introduced into the hospitals’ cost
function and thought to be more relevant than the incremental changes in the penalty amount (Gupta, 2017).
Other advantages of assessing the penalty status as compared to its amount are that it is constant across years,
independent from the relative reimbursements for that emergency condition and less likely to be a↵ected by
regression to the mean (Joshi et al., 2019).9 Increases or decreases in the reimbursement amount might confound
the time-invariant performance analysis. For instance, some hospitals might do very poorly, but since they have
low relative reimbursements in that category they end up with the same penalty amount.
Any measure of quality based on incentivized metrics might reflect heterogeneity in strategic decision making by
hospitals (Mehta, 2019). While penalties a↵ect the trade-o↵ between treatment cost and readmission probability,
it is by no means clear whether no, or very few, readmissions are optimal from the point of view of a hospital’s
management. If the costs of avoiding readmissions are high, optimizing behavior will tolerate some penalties up
to the point where marginal costs are equalized. Thus, systematic di↵erences in the penalty likelihood between
hospitals can be indicative of di↵erences in the trade-o↵, or the way it is evaluated, in these hospitals. Of
particular interest is whether for-profit hospitals systematically di↵er in this regard from other hospitals (Capps,
Carlton and David, 2017; Chang and Jacobson, 2017). We assess this by regressing our extracted quality metric
on hospitals’ time-invariant characteristics, including hospital ownership. It has been suggested that potential
for-profit gaps may be due to strategic flexibility which may be crowded out by competition (Duggan, 2002;
Gaynor, Ho and Town, 2015). We test whether this for-profit gap in quality varies with standard measures of
local market concentration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index [HHI]. We then assess the interaction of
ownership, market concentration and managerial oversight of hospitals, the latter being measured as whether
they are part of a hospital system or not (Eliason et al., 2019).
9Since our measure is based on the penalty, rather than the readmission ratio or penalty amount, regression
to the mean is much less problematic. Almost half of the hospitals are either always or never fined, indicating a
strong persistence in penalty status incompatible with regression to the mean. Our approach further circumvents
regression towards the mean by explicitly accounting for the longitudinal dimension in estimation.
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2.2 Estimation strategy
We model the probability of being penalized using a probit model:
P (ycit = 1|xit,↵ci ) =  (↵ci + x0it ), (1)
where ycit is an indicator of hospital i being penalized in year t for exceeding readmissions in emergency condition
c, i.e. ERRcit > 1, and  (·) denotes the standard normal cdf. Our main interest lies in the fixed e↵ects ↵ci ,
the quality measures for hospital i in condition c over the whole sample period. The vector xit contains time-
varying covariates at the hospital, HRR and county level, as well as year indicators to control for common time
shocks. We cluster standard errors throughout at the hospital level. The fixed e↵ects are estimated via di↵erent
indicator-variable approaches: first, pooled across conditions – one fixed e↵ect per hospital (3,917) stacking all
years and conditions; second, interacted condition ⇥ hospital (8,713); and, finally, estimating the regressions
separately by condition. We show below that each approach leads to qualitatively similar conclusions.
Since there are only five available years, in the constant policy environment, standard maximum likelihood
approaches for binary fixed e↵ects panel data would disregard any hospital that does not change penalty status.
This would mean that a hospital in a very healthy environment could get the same ranking as one in a less
advantaged area, if both are either never or always fined (this problem of perfect prediction is well known in
the non-linear panel literature, see Maddala, 1983). In our data this issue is quite severe, as a large share of
hospitals are penalized in every period or never. Since with only a short set of time periods (in our case five)
it is unreasonable to assume that not observing a penalty implies that no shock could ever occur to push the
hospital over the penalty cuto↵ and disregard any environmental information for such hospitals, this is a rather
unappealing model implications for a measure of performance.
To address this, we estimate equation (1) using the bias-reduced probit fixed e↵ect panel model as proposed by
Kunz, Staub and Winkelmann (2018), which is based on a generalized linear model estimator first suggested
by Kosmidis and Firth (2009). This estimator deals with the small sample (short T ) problem of estimating
the hospital fixed e↵ects with few observations, and embeds an ex-ante shrinkage of the fixed e↵ects towards
0 (this value implies a marginal latent hospital quality corresponding to a 50-50 propensity to be penalized net
of covariates). The estimator allows decomposing the time-variant from the time-invariant heterogeneity of all
hospitals.
The closest to our approach is a linear probability model with an ex-post shrinkage by, for example, empirical
Bayes (which we present in Appendix Table B3). This type of shrinkage has become ubiquitous in the literature
on hospital quality (Chandra et al., 2016; Hull, 2016; Propper, Burgess and Gossage, 2008) but also in other
pay-for-performance metrics (Bonhomme and Weidner, 2019; Chetty, Friedman and Rocko↵, 2014). But it has
the rather unappealing property that shrinkage is ex-post and that there is little guidance on its implementation:
approaches include random e↵ects assumptions, using the residual of the quality equation, or fitting a normal
distribution around the fixed e↵ects estimates (a detailed overview between di↵erent shrinkage approaches
is given in MacKenzie et al., 2015). Further, these methods often involve unappealing assumptions such as
homogeneity which is impossible with binary outcomes (pointed out by Frederiksen, Kahn and Lange, 2019).
Since in our approach the shrinkage is part of the estimation there is no ambiguity from choosing di↵erent forms
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or di↵erent target means to shrink towards: it automatically shrinks towards the conservative benchmark of
the marginal hospital that has neither positive nor negative relative quality. The estimated  (↵ci ) also bear a
model-consistent interpretation as the propensity (score) of penalty for a marginal hospital which respects the
0-1 bounds without any ad hoc adjustments.
To assess strategic behavior embedded in these quality metrics we estimate OLS regressions of the form
 (↵̂ci ) =  1For-profiti +  2For-profiti ⇥HHIihrr + z0i  +  ci +  ihrr + "i, (2)
where zi contains (almost) constant measures of hospitals’ teaching status, urban, size, and county-level co-
variates; and emergency condition  ci and hospital referral region fixed e↵ects  ihrr . To test whether observed
di↵erences by for-profit status change when market conditions change, we interact the for-profit indicator with
our measure of market concentration (the HHI from condition-specific discharges), and stratify by whether the
hospital is part of a system.
2.3 Data
We use administrative Hospital Compare data (from the CMS) for information on penalties announced in
each July of the years 2012–2016. Reporting is delayed by one year, so the data relate to the three-year
aggregates of readmissions during the years 2011–2015. For each of the 3,197 included hospitals and each of
the three emergency conditions, we know whether or not a penalty was issued in the five years (the full sample
of hospital⇥condition is 8,713, and ⇥year is 41,095). All employed datasets are public use files to facilitate
replication. Detailed variable descriptions, as well as descriptive statistics for our sample by emergency condition
and penalty status, and all included variables are reported in the Appendix C and Table C1, respectively.
In the first step (1), we seek to extract the latent hospital quality—which is not driven by aggregate changes
over time and local area characteristics beyond the hospital’s control— from the penalty status indicator. We
follow the extant literature (Chandra et al., 2016; Gu et al., 2014) to select relevant covariates. We use several
measures at the HRR-level provided by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. In particular, we use the number
of ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions (ACSC), measuring accessibility of local primary health care (Gu et al.,
2014), and changes in the number of hospitals in the region (Chandra et al., 2016).10 At the county-level, we
use the Federal Information Processing Standard to add community characteristics, such as the poverty rate
and the median household income, which have been discussed as determinants of readmission rates outside the
control of the hospital (Herrin et al., 2015). We then compare our extracted quality measures (fixed e↵ects) to
non-incentivized quality indicators in the CMS data: overall average readmission rate of the hospital, average
hospital mortality in the respective condition, and patient satisfaction (the share of patients who would not
recommend the hospital).
Most hospital- as well as regional-level variables display little or no within-hospital variation. Consequently, we
include these in the second step estimation (2). In particular, we use urban/rural, teaching status of hospital,
size (number of beds), for-profit, and system status from the corresponding final rule impact files. To assess
10Here, as is common in the literature (see Chandra et al., 2016), we define market entry and exit as changes
in the hospital market, which need not be literal entries or exits.
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local market concentration we construct a standard measure of competition, the HHI based on the number of
discharges in the respective emergency condition in the HRR.11
3 Results: Heterogeneity in hospital quality
3.1 Time-variant vs time-invariant quality
Raw correlates of penalty status with hospital ownership structure suggest that there is a sizable for-profit
gap in penalties of 7.2 percent, but only a minor system (chain) gap of 1.4 percent.12 Table 1 presents the
estimation results from regression (1). Column (1) shows coe cients of a simple bivariate linear regression of the
penalty indicator on each of the variables indicated in the row names. A substantial HRR market-level variation
is evident from, for example, the HRR-level covariates of ACSC discharges or the closing hospitals; and the
(unconditional) county-level correlates of penalty risk are as expected: poverty, population and unemployment
increase penalty risk; while median income reduces it.
Columns (2) and (3) present the results from our bias-reduced fixed e↵ects probit estimator and show coe cient
estimates of some selected covariates.13 Column (2) corresponds to a restricted (pooled) model, with separate
sets of hospital fixed e↵ects (↵i) and condition fixed e↵ects (↵c). Column (3) corresponds to equation (1),
which includes one fixed e↵ect for each hospital-condition combination (↵ci ). The results show that most of the
HRR and county-level associations become statistically insignificant and/or economically small once hospital
fixed e↵ects are conditioned on. Only discharges for ACSC in the HRR seem to have a consistent e↵ect on
the penalty risk. Such discharges measure the HRR-level accessibility and e↵ectiveness of local primary health
care, which is outside the hospital’s control but significantly a↵ects their penalty propensity, confirming prior
cross-sectional evidence (Gu et al., 2014).
The main objective of these estimations is to obtain predictions of the fixed e↵ects ↵̂i or ↵̂ci , respectively, which
we use to calculate marginal penalty propensities,  (↵̂i) and  (↵̂ci ). This probability can be thought of as the
propensity to be fined if the hospital would otherwise be marginal (x0it ̂ = 0). We bin these into twenty groups
using 5%-penalty-probability increments, for the di↵erent conditions. Figure 1 shows their within-hospital
correlations. There is a large share of always- and never-penalized hospitals, which suggest an important role for
time-invariant factors (cf. Appendix, Table B1). The strong correlation across conditions is further consistent
with such a non-negligible hospital-wide (or emergency-department-wide) component to quality, rather than
with behavior in which there is a trade-o↵ between investing in lowering risk in one condition at the expense
of tolerating a higher risk in another.14 Remarkably, the figure further shows that there is not only a long
11It makes little di↵erence for the results whether we calculate the HHI on the number of beds (an approach
more commonly taken) or on the respective (condition) and realized discharges.
12In Table B1, we present the sample means across penalty status.
13The full results by diagnosis condition, alongside OLS regressions based on the excess readmission ratio as
the outcome variable, are presented in Appendix Table B2.
14We further tested whether there is evidence for additional condition-specific variation or whether all or
most of the quality is constant within the hospital using a randomization test analogous to the test by Abrams,
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2012) that accounts for the uncertainty in the estimated fixed e↵ects. We find
that only PN di↵ers significantly (enough) from HF but both are too similar to AMI to be distinguished, which
again suggests AMI is a useful summary measure of quality (results not reported).
8
high-quality tail in the uni-dimensional measures of quality (Figure B1), but the size of the circles confirms this
across conditions. This bivariate long tail is most pronounced between AMI and heart failure which are both
heart conditions perhaps most likely to exhibit strong complementarities.15
Figure 2 presents the association of our hospital quality measures with other hospital-wide quality metrics. Here,
we use the hospital fixed e↵ect from the restricted model of Column (2) in Table 1 to obtain a single quality
measure per hospital. The three graphs in the figure show how the rank in quality measure (grouped into 100
bins) correlates, respectively, with the non-incentivized performance measures of the overall readmission rate,
the average hospital mortality (in the same condition), and patient satisfaction. All three of these measures
correlate positively with our quality measure; the readmission rate and patient satisfaction, very strongly so.
These results, too, confirm that the proposed measure captures a broad hospital-wide rather than an (emergency)
department-wide-only quality. The strong correspondence between objective measures, such as readmissions,
and subjective ones, such as patient survey responses, is notable. Ex-ante it is by no means clear that patients
would value the same quality dimensions as those relate to readmissions or even mortality.
Taken together, these results suggest a common hospital quality. In Figure 3 we show the geographic variation in
the average marginal-penalty propensity within broad geographic (HRR) regions. A striking feature of the map
is the substantial spatial heterogeneity in hospital quality (net of regional socio-economic indicators which were
already accounted for in the first step). The estimated propensity of being penalized at HRR level varies from
15 to 95%, with an interquartile penalty-propensity di↵erence that is as large as 14.8 percentage points. This
suggests not only an individual hospital-level but also a substantial market-level role for the variation in quality.
This dispersion in geography of this time-constant quality metic is remarkable. To assess determinants of this
variation we correlate it at the local level with commonly hypothesized influences, ownership and competition,
and a less commonly addressed one, chain status.
3.2 Quality, ownership and competition
Table 2 contains our main results for the di↵erences in quality associated with for-profit, competition, and
system-status, using functionals of our predicted hospital quality fixed e↵ects as dependent variables in a number
of linear regressions. In each of these regressions, the measure of quality (marginal propensity, percentile ranking,
and being among the top 10%) is regressed on a number of hospital and county-level demographic characteristics
and diagnosis-condition indicators. Column (1) uses the predicted fixed e↵ects from the restricted model, giving
one observation per hospital. Column (2) uses the full model where there is a fixed e↵ect for each hospital-
condition (standard errors are clustered at the hospital level). A small number of hospitals changed their
for-profit status during the observation period: Column (3) omits these hospitals from the estimation sample.16
Our aim is to assess whether the for-profit gap is present using our estimated measure of quality. We begin by
examining the marginal penalty propensity (Panel A). As the coe cient on for-profit in these three columns
15In the appendix, we present results using the raw measure ↵ci and equally spaced groups for both BRglm
and OLS with empirical Bayes correction. Both show a strong correlation across conditions as well as the long
tail, cf. Table B2; which is also evident in the individual densities in both BRglm as well as OLS fixed e↵ects,
see Appendix Figure B1.
16Column (1) and (2) uses for-profit status in the first period, i.e. before or at the time of policy change.
9
show, it clearly is. The coe cient in Column (3), Panel A, indicates that the marginal probability of incurring a
penalty is 3 percentage points higher for for-profit hospitals. In Column (4), the regressions additionally control
for the full set of hospital referral region fixed e↵ects. As a result, the for-profit discrepancy increases to 5
percentage points when keeping the regional environment constant across hospitals. We test the hypothesis that
competition can drive out the for-profit di↵erential by interacting the for-profit indicator with the HHI based on
discharges in the respective penalized condition in Column (5). We continue to condition on HRR fixed e↵ects
throughout. The results indicate that competition seems to reduce the for-profit di↵erential substantially. The
coe cient on the interaction term (0.129) is positive and statistically significant, implying that the di↵erential
increases strongly with market concentration. At the mean market concentration, HHI=0.149, the di↵erential
implies a 5.4 percentage-point larger penalty propensity for a for-profit hospital (row: For-profit + interaction).
The di↵erential is predicted to decrease to roughly 3.5 percentage points in a market with a concentration that
is one standard deviation below the mean. Finally, Columns (6) and (7) assess the impact that the heterogeneity
in ownership has on the for-profit di↵erential. The sample is split into hospitals that are not part of a system
(Column 6), and hospitals that are (Column 7). The for-profit gap, as well as the competition association, are
not statistically significant (joint p = 0.788) for independent hospitals. In contrast, we estimate a significant
competition e↵ect in the system hospitals. Among system-hospitals, for-profits have a 6.6 percentage point
higher penalty-risk in markets of average concentration; almost doubling their quality-gap in a fully competitive
setting. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that roughly 17% of the interquartile range between HHR
quality might be “explained” by the responses to market structure of for-profit system hospitals.17
Panels B and C examine functions of the predicted hospital quality measures. Panel B presents the percentile
ranking of the hospital. This is based only on a relative metric and not the absolute di↵erences between the
estimated fixed e↵ects and thus disregards the magnitude of the long high-quality tail. The e↵ects are largely
similar, if slightly stronger. Panel C assesses the long quality tail explicitly, using as the dependent variable an
indicator of being in the best 10 percent of hospitals (defined for each condition). The first four columns show
that, on average, there is a negative association between for-profit status and the probability of being in the top
of the quality distribution, but this is statistically significant only when comparing within HRR. The results in
Column (5) show that there are substantial interactions with market structure: the more monopolistic a HRR
is, the less likely is it that for-profit hospitals are among the top performers. A comparison of columns (6)
and (7) shows that this result is only for hospitals that are part of a system. For such hospitals, the estimated
probability of a for-profit hospital being in the top 10% of performers in a HRR of average concentration is 4.4
percent lower than in a fully competitive environment. In other words, the negative for-profit gap would be
completely crowded out in a fully competitive market for system hospitals.18
17This is the concentration e↵ect times the standard deviation in concentration, divided by the interquartile
range: 0.195·0.1280.148 .
18Appendix Tables B3 and B4 show that our results are robust to a large set of checks. Table B3 assesses
di↵erent quality metrics, based on raw-average readmission rates, excess readmission ratios (risk-adjusted), or
covariate-adjusted excess readmission ratios (via OLS with empirical Bayes), mean penalty or OLS-Bayes ad-
justed penalty. While BRglm outperforms any such metric, reassuringly, the results are not model-dependent.
However, the comparison to the raw-average penalty benchmark makes it clear that some form of regional
adjustment is necessary to meaningfully assess competition. B4 shows that our main results are not a↵ected by
using OLS in the second step. Panel B drops government hospitals from the comparison. Panel C uses HHI-beds
(which are constant within hospital) rather than HHI-discharges. Panel D adds an additional post-estimation
shrinkage to the already shrunk BRglm estimates. Panel E shows there are similar but less pronounced tenden-
cies among the top 25% hospitals.
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4 Discussion and conclusion
The di↵erences in the behavior of for- and non-profits in public service provision are well documented, recent ex-
amples include technology adoption (Horwitz, Hsuan and Nichols, 2018), the provision of free care (Garthwaite,
Gross and Notowidigdo, 2018), and the need for financial incentives to motivate workers (Besley and Ghatak,
2005). As the ownership and market structure of the hospital market changes, it is important to understand how
this may be associated with hospital quality. To address this, we assess the distribution of latent heterogeneity
in quality using an estimator of the underlying penalty-risk of being fined under a flagship program designed
to incentivize hospital quality. We find quality to be strongly correlated across diagnostic conditions within a
hospital, suggesting a common hospital-wide quality. This is further supported by a strong association of the
ranking of our quality measure with hospitals’ overall-readmission rates in non-incentivized and non-emergency
conditions as well as mortality-rates in incentivized conditions, and even with patient survey responses.
In the raw data, for-profit hospitals are around seven percent more likely to be penalized than other hospitals.
Our analysis shows that a large share of this di↵erence remains even after extracting the medium-run quality
component and adjusting for market (HRR) fixed e↵ects. We find a substantial gradient in this for-profit gap
by market structure. The gap is largely crowded out by competition, particularly amongst the best performing
hospitals. We also find a large role for system ownership: both the quality gap and the interaction of for-
profit status with market structure are driven by hospitals which are part of a system. These findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that for-profit hospitals have a di↵erent quality-penalty trade-o↵ which varies
with market and ownership structure. Our results also show that the penalty-risk varies significantly across
HRRs. A substantial part of this variation in quality is independent of common demographic indicators. Thus,
our results indicate not only that there is a sizable dispersion of individual hospital quality, but it is also
exhibited at the level of the region.
Our results apply to publicly insured patients. However, complementary research by Cooper et al. (2019)
shows that both market concentration, as well as ownership, are associated with how hospitals price privately
insured patients. This suggests that our results might extend to other patient populations. Since preventable
readmissions are not only a metric of quality but also very costly, our results might further contribute to
explaining the geographic variation in health care costs and its association with quality (Doyle, Graves and
Gruber, 2017; Finkelstein, Gentzkow and Williams, 2016).
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Figure 1: Within hospital readmission penalty propensity across diagnosis related groups,
binned
Note: Figure plots correlation of hospital fixed e↵ects across diagnosis conditions (AMI, HF, PN). We use the estimated
fixed e↵ects from eq.(1), ie.  (↵̂ci ) from the interacted model. We separate these into 20 bins of 5 percent increments.
Then we calculate the corresponding average penalty propensity in the condition given on the y-axis. For example, the
first dot in Panel A, corresponds to the 5 percent best quality hospitals in AMI. Hospitals in this bin have an average
propensity for a penalty in HF of almost 0, the same hospitals in panel B, are slightly higher but still close to 0 for
PN. The size of the circles show the number of hospitals in this category. It is evident that the long-quality-tail, exists
across conditions rather than in separate conditions, cf. Appendix Figure B1 for the individual uni-variate density plots,
based on the separated-model, Figure B2 presents the non-binned raw ↵ version as well as those based on analogus OLS
estimates.
Source: CMS 2011-2015, Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, Census 2010, ACS, own calculations.
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Figure 2: Within hospital readmission penalty propensity across diagnosis related groups,
binned
Note: Figure plots bins of hospital fixed e↵ects and corresponding averages of other quality measures: overall readmission
rate, mortality rate in respective emergency condition, patient survey responses. The x-axes are identical, and based on
the pooled regression model (Column 5, Table 1). These estimated fixed e↵ects are ranked and binned into 100 equal
sized percentile ranks. Within each rank the y-axis quality measures are averaged. In Panel A - overall readmission rate
in the hospital, B- the average mortality across time and the 3 diagnosis groups, and C- the survey based share of people
answering they would not recommend this hospital.
Source: CMS 2011-2015, Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, Census 2010, ACS, own calculations.
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Figure 3: Average within hospital adjusted readmission penalty propensities across hospital
referral regions
Note: Figure plots average hospital penalty-propensity (for the marginal hospital) across the map of hospital referral
regions, based on averages of marginal penalty propensity using the interactive fixed e↵ects of Table 1, Column 6.
Source: CMS 2011-2015, Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, Census 2010, ACS, own calculations.
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Table 1: Association of penalty-risk and selected covariates
Regressions
Bivariate BR probit BR probit
OLS with ↵i FE with ↵ci FE
(1) (2) (3)
HRR-level covariates
Hospital opening -0.005 0.007 0.008
(0.004) (0.022) (0.024)
Hospital closing 0.043 -0.047 -0.046
(0.005) (0.018) (0.020)
Discharges for ACSC 0.010 0.025 0.026
(0.000) (0.004) (0.005)
County-level covariates
Share in poverty (all ages) 0.008 -0.004 -0.004
(0.000) (0.006) (0.006)
Median HH income (in 10T$) -0.005 -0.028 -0.025
(0.001) (0.041) (0.045)
Population (in 100T) 0.002 0.036 0.031
(0.000) (0.037) (0.041)
Unemployment rate 0.026 -0.011 -0.012
(0.001) (0.012) (0.013)
Observations 41,095 41,095 41,095
Hospital characteristics X X
Year fixed e↵ects X X
Diagnosis indicators X
Hospital-condition fixed e↵ects 3,197 8,173
Notes: Table presents bivariate-OLS coe cients (robust standard errors), and BRglm panel regressions (clustered stan-
dard errors in brackets). Columns (1) presents association (bivariate regression coe cient) of mean penalty on indicated
characteristics. Columns (2) and (3), show the first-step of our main results, the BRglm regressions using individual fixed
e↵ects, in (2) pooled across conditions (one fixed e↵ect per hospital), (3) one fixed e↵ect for each hospital-condition pair.
Table B1 presents descriptive statistics by penalty status and B2 presents the full regression results for each condition
separately, alongside analogous OLS regressions for the excess readmission ratio. More on the construction and definition
of the variables used can be found in Appendix Table C1.
Source: CMS 2011-2015, Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, Census 2010, ACS, own calculations.
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Table 2: Association of different measures of penalty-risk and selected covariates
Dependent variables: Measures of hospitals time-invariant penalty heterogeneity (BRglm fixed e↵ects)
Local hospital market
Constant HRR Part of a system
Pooled All Ownership FE HHI No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Marginal hospitals penalty propensity  (↵i)
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.023 0.030 0.031 0.052 0.035 -0.056 0.037
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.044) (0.016)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.129 0.106 0.195
(0.074) (0.221) (0.092)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.054 -0.040 0.066
p =.011 p =.788 p =.004
Panel B: Hospital percentile ranking
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.043 0.036 0.038 0.061 0.046 -0.064 0.050
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.046) (0.017)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.111 0.077 0.186
(0.079) (0.235) (0.099)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.063 -0.053 0.078
p =.023 p =.951 p =.007
Panel C: Indicator whether hospital is in the top 10%
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.005 -0.010 -0.013 -0.036 0.001 0.053 0.003
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018) (0.063) (0.019)
⇥ HHI-discharges -0.284 -0.257 -0.338
(0.093) (0.270) (0.108)
For-profit + Interaction* -0.041 0.015 -0.047
p =.000 p =.347 p =.000
Observations 3,197 8,713 8,072 8,072 8,072 2,153 5,919
Hospitals characteristics X X X X X X X
County demographics X X X X X X X
HRR fixed e↵ects X X X X
Notes: Table presents OLS coe cients. Columns (1) display regressions based on pooled fixed e↵ects and robust standard
errors, from Table 1(Col. 5), (2)-(7) the full set of fixed e↵ects and accordingly cluster robust standard errors on the
hospital level, corresponding to Table 1(Col. 6). All regressions contain hospital characteristics (teaching status 3-
categories, size based on number of beds 3-categories, whether it belongs to a system, and whether its located in an
urban area) as well as county-level demographics based on census (such as share of people older 65, share of non-hispanic
whites, hispanics, blacks, share of population college educated, high school educate), and condition indicators. Column
(3) reduces the estimation sample to those that did not change ownership in the sample period, (4) additionally includes
HRR fixed e↵ects, (5) interaction with HHI, (6) and (7) split the sample between hospitals that are part of a system and
those that are not. For-profit + Interaction*, shows the for-profit gap for an average HHI 0.149 and the p-value whether
the sum of both coe cients is significantly di↵erent from 0.
Source: CMS 2011-2015, Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, Census 2010, ACS, own calculations.
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A Policy
Figure A1, depicts the changes in the HRRP over the sample period. The policy amount was repeatedly changed as
shown by the maximum penalty cap.
-
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Period I: Jul 2008 - Jun 2011 FY 2013
Period II: Jul 2009 - Jun 2012 FY 2014
Period III: Jul 2010 - Jun 2013 FY 2015
Period IV: Jul 2011 - Jun 2014 FY 2016
Period V: Jul 2012 - Jun 2015 FY 2017




1 Oct 2012: starting of HRRP
penalties for Period I (max penalty 1%)
1 Oct 2013: Period II, (max penalty 2%),
exclusion of planned stays
1 Oct 2014: Period III, (max penalty 3%),
extension to further conditions.
Figure A1: Event line and sample period of HRRP Policy
Source: Adapted from Figure 1 in Wasfy et al. (2017)
Hospitals with at least 25 discharges for a diagnosis and part of the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) were
eligible.19 Thier excess readmission ratio in emergency category c in year t measures the “total predicted readmissions
[PRR] at a hospital [i] compared with the total expected readmission if the patients were treated at an average hospital









A penalty was imposed if this ratio of expected versus average was strictly greater than 1, ie. RRcit   1 > 0. The dollar
amount of the penalty was calculated as 1 minus the “readmissions adjustment factor” —aggregate payments for these
excess Medicare payments divided by aggregate Medicare payments for all discharges— multiplied by the hospital’s
base diagnosis related group payments, thus,












We focus on the extensive margin of a penalty—i.e., if ERRcit   1 > 0—across any of the three conditions. The
penalty-cuto↵ is a policy-relevant discontinuity introduced into the hospitals’ cost function (see, Gupta, 2017, for a
detailed discussion).
Other interesting policy metrics are the conditional-on-penalty size of the readmission ratio and the second implied
cut-o↵, which occurs at the upper end of the excess readmissions, where the payment amount does not increase further
as it is capped, this cap maximum rate of penalty was one percent in 2013, raised to two in 2014, and three in 2015,
again complicating both the quality metrics over time.20
19Hospitals in Maryland are excepted from the policy due to a special Medicare agreement.
20In FY 2015, the conditions were extended to include chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), elective
hip or knee replacement, and in FY 2017 to coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) and an extended pneumonia
definition was put in place.
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B Additional results
First, we present the density plots separately by condition and for the BRglm and OLS estimation approach, both
exhibit a long high-quality tail, and a comparable between approximative-OLS and model-consistent BRglm.
Figure B1: Density plot of separately estimated fixed effects, left Penalty-BRglm, right
RR-OLS-Bayes
Note: Figure plots density plots of hospital fixed e↵ects across diagnosis conditions (AMI, HF, PN). We use the estimated
fixed e↵ects from eq.(1), ie.  (↵̂ci ) from the separated model. Left graph is based on Penalty-BRglm model and right
graph on the Penalty-OLS model.
Source: CMS 2011-2015, Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, Census 2010, ACS, own calculations.
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Second, we assess the correlation in quality between conditions. Across each, there are highly related and the long
high-quality tail is evident not only in the uni-variant comparison above, but also across conditions. Again using the
shrunken BRglm fixed e↵ects or OLS with post-estimation shrinkage gives comparable results, yet, the long quality tail
is much clearer when using the marginal penalty propensity (main text). Also many of the top bins in this plot actually
have a marginal propensity of 100%, which would need to be converted using the OLS results but is implicit in the
BRglm in the main text.
Figure B2: Robustness to Figure 1, equal sized bins of raw alpha and comparison with OLS
fixed effects
Note: Figure presents the unrestricted fixed e↵ects from regression eq (1) (top row) and analogues OLS regressions with
post-estimation empirical Bayes shrinkage (bottom row). The fixed e↵ects are clustered in 20 equal sized bins and the
average performance (in the y-axis condition) is plotted.
Source: CMS 2011-2015, Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, Census 2010, ACS, own calculations.
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Table B1: Descriptives by penalty-status
Sample means by penalty-status Bivariate
Never Sometimes Always Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hospital-level covariates
For-profit hospital 0.146 0.203 0.226 0.072
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Hospital is part of a system 0.727 0.743 0.747 0.014
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
HRR-level covariates
Share of for-profit hospitals 0.178 0.202 0.199 0.115
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011)
Number of hospitals per 100T capita 1.181 0.848 0.628 -0.045
(0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001)
Hospital opening 0.273 0.271 0.260 -0.005
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Hospital closing 0.150 0.181 0.200 0.043
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Discharges for ACSC 28.493 31.834 34.632 0.010
(0.087) (0.058) (0.092) (0.000)
County-level covariates
Share in poverty (all ages) 15.576 16.398 17.551 0.008
(0.052) (0.038) (0.065) (0.000)
Median HH income (in 10T$) 5.186 5.185 5.104 -0.005
(0.013) (0.009) (0.016) (0.001)
Population (in 100T) 6.498 8.603 11.132 0.002
(0.147) (0.115) (0.208) (0.000)
Unemployment rate 6.823 7.349 7.934 0.026
(0.024) (0.016) (0.025) (0.001)
Observations 9,772 22,428 8,895 41,095
Share 21.65% 54.57% 23.78%
Notes: Table presents means (standard deviations). Columns (1)-(3) display averages of covariates by penalty status,
Column (4) is the same as Col(1) in Table 1, for the time-invariant characteristics. Table B2 presents the full regression
results for each condition separately, alongside analogous OLS regressions for the excess readmission ratio. More on the
construction and definition of the variables used can be found in Appendix Table C1.
Source: CMS 2011-2015, Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, Census 2010, ACS, own calculations.
23
Table B2: Detailed regression results of penalty-risk and excess readmission ration, by
diagnosis condition
Dependent variable: readmission penalty indicator
Penalty indicator (Yes/No) Excess Readmission Ratio
Probit-BRglm OLS
AMI HF PN AMI HF PN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of discharges 0.0008 0.0014 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Number of discharges, other ER conditions 0.0004 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Number of beds  0.0003  0.0004  0.0006  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Discarges ACSCs per 1’000 enrolles, in HRR 0.0302 0.0268 0.0205 0.0026 0.0016 0.0012
(0.0093) (0.0079) (0.0073) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Hospital opening, in HRR  0.0215  0.0010 0.0384  0.0026 0.0007 0.0008
(0.0456) (0.0395) (0.0388) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0017)
Hospital closing, Hin HRRrr  0.0683  0.0331  0.0428  0.0036  0.0012  0.0028
(0.0379) (0.0321) (0.0326) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Percent living in poverty, in county  0.0066 0.0008  0.0055  0.0006  0.0000  0.0008
(0.0146) (0.0110) (0.0091) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Household median income in 10’000$, in county  0.1466 0.0574  0.0200  0.0054  0.0032  0.0032
(0.1055) (0.0793) (0.0697) (0.0051) (0.0036) (0.0034)
Total population in 100’000, in county 0.0187 0.0594 0.0313  0.0010 0.0047 0.0034
(0.0702) (0.0665) (0.0601) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Percent unemployed, in county  0.0267  0.0130  0.0069  0.0019  0.0011  0.0011
(0.0276) (0.0221) (0.0203) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Number of observations 10,972 14,951 15,172 10,972 14,951 15,172
Number of hospitals 2,397 3,138 3,178 2,397 3,138 3,178
Share of concordant observations, 0 24.2 24.5 24.9
Share of concordant observations, 1 23.4 23.4 21.2
 (x0 ) 0.19 0.09 0.30
Hospital fixed e↵ects X X X X X X
Time fixed e↵ects X X X X X X
Notes: See Table notes in 1. Here, regressions are separately run for each condition in Column (1)-(3), and as comparison
(4)-(6) present OLS-fixed e↵ect regressions using the excess readmission ratio as outcome, recall that penalty is defined
in this ratio is larger than 1, thus large di↵erences between the two sets of regressions might indicate gaming.
Source: CMS 2011-2015, Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, Census 2010, ACS, own calculations.
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Table B3: Association of different measures penalty-risk and selected covariates
Constant HRR Part of a system
Pooled All Ownership FE HHI No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Raw mean RR
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.006 0.018 0.010
(0.004) (0.015) (0.004)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.003 0.001 0.003
p =.016 p =.220 p =.004
Panel B: Raw mean ERR, risk-adjusted
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.011 -0.010 0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.025 0.058 0.049
(0.018) (0.062) (0.023)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.014 -0.002 0.016
p =.027 p =.387 p =.004
Panel C: Ebayes OLS ERR
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.008 -0.024 0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.050 0.126 0.070
(0.019) (0.064) (0.023)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.016 -0.005 0.019
p =.000 p =.071 p =.000
Panel D: Raw mean penalty
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.056 0.065 0.065 0.076 0.074 0.034 0.064
(0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.060) (0.022)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.020 -0.322 0.165
(0.101) (0.316) (0.131)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.076 -0.014 0.089
p =.290 p =.297 p =.047
Panel E: Ebayes OLS Penalty
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.050 0.054 0.057 0.079 0.059 -0.051 0.060
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.054) (0.019)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.155 0.110 0.258
(0.098) (0.314) (0.124)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.082 -0.035 0.098
p =.013 p =.833 p =.004
Observations 3,197 8,713 8,072 8,072 8,072 2,153 5,919
Hospitals characteristics X X X X X X X
County demographics X X X X X X X
HRR fixed e↵ects X X X X
Notes: See Table notes in 2, Panel A - shows average raw readmission rate, B - raw mean of the excess
readmission ratios (accounts for basic risk adjustment), C - OLS fixed e↵ects on ERR with post-estimation
E.Bayes correction (thus adds local area risk adjustment), D - uses the raw mean of the penalty status (policy
indicator), E - again compares to the OLS with post-shrinkage.
Source: CMS 2011-2015, Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, Census 2010, ACS, own calculations.
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Table B4: Association of different measures penalty-risk and selected covariates
Constant HRR Part of a system
Pooled All Ownership FE HHI No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Fractional response regressions, probit:  (↵i)
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.082 0.091 0.095 0.169 0.121 -0.167 0.132
(0.035) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.035) (0.098) (0.040)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.369 0.257 0.554
(0.190) (0.512) (0.235)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.176 -0.129 0.214
p =.003 p =.840 p =.001
Panel B: Without government hospitals
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.030 0.035 0.036 0.060 0.035 -0.059 0.041
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.042) (0.017)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.205 0.334 0.181
(0.086) (0.194) (0.104)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.066 -0.009 0.068
p =.001 p =.102 p =.016
Observations+ 2,607 7,229 6,814 6,814 6,814 1,443 5,371
Panel C: HHI based on beds (constant within hospital)
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.023 0.030 0.031 0.052 0.034 -0.054 0.039
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.051) (0.017)
⇥ HHI-beds 0.158 0.108 0.205
(0.099) (0.353) (0.114)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.056 -0.039 0.067
p =.028 p =.861 p =.017
Panel D: Additional post-shrinkage empirical Bayes
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.129 0.131 0.139 0.200 0.146 -0.157 0.152
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.043) (0.127) (0.048)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.413 0.116 0.686
(0.242) (0.689) (0.306)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.208 -0.140 0.254
p =.009 p =.946 p =.002
Panel E: Indicator whether hospital is in top 25%
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) -0.043 -0.022 -0.023 -0.055 -0.024 0.174 -0.045
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.072) (0.025)
⇥ HHI-discharges -0.242 -0.445 -0.184
(0.124) (0.364) (0.151)
For-profit + Interaction* -0.060 0.108 -0.073
p =.015 p =.389 p =.085
Panel F: Too few discharges - robustness whether gaming via up/down-coding or selective admission
For-profit hospital (Yes/No) 0.031 0.040 0.041 0.005 -0.017 0.023 -0.031
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.024) (0.078) (0.026)
⇥ HHI-discharges 0.159 0.543 0.025
(0.126) (0.419) (0.139)
For-profit + Interaction* 0.007 0.105 -0.027
p =.196 p =.120 p =.962
Observations+ 3,197 9,564 8,814 8,814 8,814 2,467 6,347
Observations 3,197 8,713 8,072 8,072 8,072 2,153 5,919
Hospitals characteristics X X X X X X X
County demographics X X X X X X X
HRR fixed e↵ects X X X X
Notes: See Table notes in 2. Panel A fractional probit model, B - drops government run hospitals, C - calculates
the HHI using number of beds (rather than condition-specific discharges), D - adds an additional post-shrinkage
to the BRglm estimates, and E - uses as dependent variable an indicator whether the hospital-condition pair is in
the top 25%, and F - shows the results for too few discharges that does not vary with ownership or competition.
If Observations+ are not indicated in the Panel they are the same as in the main regressions and indicated at
the bottom.




We start by performing minor corrections on the file CBSAtoCountycrosswalk FY13.xls21 to the crosswalk between
county and FIPS State county, which is linkable to the hospital compare data (i.e. SAINT CLAIR we set equal to ST.
CLAIR). Note, that island states such as AMERICAN SAMOA are dropped because we could not merge them to
county nor HRR information.
County information
Using the FIPS indicators, we compiled for the years 2011-2015:
Rural Atlas Update14/Jobs.csv and Rural Atlas Update14/People.csv files22 from which we get the variables such
as: yearly unemployment rate, and yearly total population/100,000.
Next, we use the file SAIPESNC 05APR17 15 02 58 98.csv,23 which provides yearly measures of all ages in poverty (in
percent) and the median household income (in dollars/10,000). We then merge them via the FIPS crosswalk, all
hospitals which could not be merged are included in the regressions with a missing indicator for county.
Hospital Referral Region information
We use zip code crosswalks:24 ZipHsaHrr10.xls-ZipHsaHrr14.xls from the Dartmouth Atlas, which allows us to
connect the Zip codes to HRRs. We use the one year lagged values as hospital data is published with a lag. We
calculate the number of hospitals for each year and define two indicators, one if there are more hospitals (in HRR) than
in the previous year, and one if there where less. Note, that we can not distinguish, whether these are actually
openings/closings of hospitals or a result of mergers or separations.
We use the number of Discharges for Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions from the selected medical discharge rates
files:25 2010 med discharges hrr.xls-2014 med discharges hrr.xls where we subtract the conditions that are equal
to our outcome measures (BacterialPneumoniaDischargesp and CongestiveHeartFailureDischar) form the total
discharges (DischargesforAmbulatoryCareS). We then merge them via the zip code crosswalk, all hospitals which could
not be merged are included in the regressions with a missing indicator for HRR.
Hospital Compare data
Our main data set is provided by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. More specifically, we use from the
Acute Inpatient PPS:26
- FY 2012 Final Rule- IPPS Impact File PUF-August 15, 2011 1.txt
- FY 2013 Final Rule CN - IPPS Impact File PUF-March 2013.txt
- FY 2014 Final Rule IPPS Impact PUF-CN1-IFC-Jan 2014.txt
- FY 2015 IPPS Final Rule Impact PUF-(CN data).txt
- FY 2016 Correction Notice Impact PUF - (CN data).txt
The construction of these variables is taken from Gu et al. (2014). First, we use the information on the number of
hospital beds which we include as 2 indicators for 100-399 beds and for more than 400. Second, we use the resident to
bed or daily ratio (rday) is larger than 0.25 as indicators of major teaching hospitals and lower than 0.25 but larger
than 0 as minor teaching hospitals. Also urban if either urgeo or urspa indicate an urban area. These covariates are
almost always constant within hospital, for the very few minor changes we set the to the first observed state, to make
them time-consistent.
21downloaded from http://www.nber.org/ssa-fips-state-county-crosswalk/ (accessed 26.03.17).
22downloaded from https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/atlas-of-rural-and-small-town-
america/download-the-data/ (accessed 26.03.17).
23downloaded from https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/saipe/saipe.html (accessed 26.03.17).
24downloaded from http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/tools/downloads.aspx?tab=39 (accessed 26.03.17).




Next, we use Hospital Compare data archive:27
- HOSArchive Revised Flatfiles 20121001/Hospital Data.csv and
READMISSION REDUCTION.csv
- HOSArchive Revised Flatfiles 20131001/Hospital Data.csv and
READMISSION REDUCTION.csv
- HOSArchive Revised Flatfiles 20141218/Hospital General Information.csv and
READMISSION REDUCTION.csv
- HOSArchive Revised FlatFiles 20151210/Hospital General Information.csv and
READMISSION REDUCTION.csv
- Hospital Revised Flatfiles/Hospital General Information.csv and
READMISSION REDUCTION.csv
from which we get for each health conditions’ READM-30-AMI-HRRP, READM-30-HF-HRRP, READM-30-PN-HRRP
the excess readmission ratio, which we define as a penalty if larger than 1, we drop the hospitals with missing
information in this (our key) variable. We use for each condition its corresponding number of discharges. Further,
across the three conditions we calculate the total number of discharges leaving-out the current condition’s discharges.
Finally, the hospital’s ownership is defined for-profit, if neither governmental nor non-profit (as above very minor
changes, which we made time-consistent by taking the maximum observed value).
Note, that missing values in the readmission variable corresponds to “too few discharges” (less than 25). In a
robustness, see appendix Table B4, we use this as dependent variable. Finally, we summarise our definitions of the key
variables in the following table.
27downloaded from https://data.medicare.gov/data/archives/hospital-compare (accessed 26.03.17).
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